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Economics is sometimes portrayed as the queen of the social sciences but to many 
fellow social scientists, economics is a joker. The reason seems to lie in the 
economists' main character, rational economic man , a figure taken for granted by 
economists and on which many of their arguments hang , yet one that few other 
social scientists can take seriously. Rational economic man is essentially a 
caricature: there is something inherently laughable about him. But while other 
social scientists might regard him with derision, economists have found him to be a 
powerful figure and regard him with affection . How and why did modem 
economics come to adopt this character as its central hero , or rather antihero? If 
we search the history of economics for portraits of economic man, we quickly fmd 
that economists used to deal with a whole person, but, over the past two centuries, 
economic man became more and more narrowly defmed . A short history of 
rational economic man will help us to understand why economists created such a 
model of man and his economic behaviour. This history is largely bound by the 
British (in the nineteenth century) and the American (in the twentieth century) 
traditions of economics, for it is within their cultures that he has flourished most 
fully. 
Whole Man 
In the beginning, there was whole man. The famous economic allegory by Bernard 
Mandeville (1705114) portrays people - men and women - as being shot full of 
many vices . Vanity, pride, envy, lust, and so forth , not even singly but in 
compound forms, combine to create a picture of people as a mixture of motivations 
which dictate their individual economic behaviour, particularly their spending 
patterns. Indeed , in Mandeville 's allegorical hive of bees, it is consumption which 
makes the economic world go around, which creates employment, innovation, 
trade, manufactures and ultimately national power. The moral of his poem, that 
simple honesty fosters economic decline while complex dishonesty creates 
economic wealth, depends on a rich, albeit cynical, portrait of economic 
behaviour.' 
We have an even more complex portrait when we come to the Scottish moral 
philosopher and founder of "classical economics", Adam Smith. It is often thought 
that Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations (1776) , was responsible for foisting self-
interested economic man onto economists. Albert Hirschman 's (1977) wonderful 
account of how the "passions" which ruled men' s behaviour in ancient times came 
to be replaced by the "self-interest" motivation in modem times can not be 
gainsaid . But it is a mistake to think that self-interest is all there is to Smith 's 
central economic character. He is indeed a male character (and thus we have the 
first narrowing from Mandeville), but in many respects he is a broader character 
than his forebear . Smith's man is a complex mixture of propensities, preferences , 
talents and motivations , including self-interest. Indeed, it is vital to Smith' s 
account of the economy that he is not just self-interested. 
Take preferences: Smith's whole man likes to avoid risk, he has a love of the 
country over the town, and prefers his homeland to overseas. This combination of 
his preferences determines the order of investment in the economy (fLfst: country 
agriculture, second: home manufacturing, and third : overseas trade) . This order of 
investment, taken at the aggregate level , is a necessary requirement in Smith's 
theory of natural economic development (for example, his 1776, Book III , chapter 
I), and it also has the unintended beneficial consequence that it maximizes home 
employment and so increases the wealth of the nation in aggregate (Book II, 
chapter V) . 
, It is no wonder that this subversive poem, written by a Dutchman but long-time 
resident in London, was banned by the magistrates and burnt in the market places. 
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Take talents: initial small differences in individual talents between people (for" By 
nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street 
porter, as a mastiff is from a greyhound." Book I, chapter II)2 leads to a division 
of labour amongst men which, for Smith, is the primary engine of growth and one 
part of the mechanism by which opulence (wealth) is spread throughout the nation. 
Take propensities: man has a natural propensity to "truck, barter and exchange" 
according to Smith ("Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange 
of one bone for another with another dog" Book I, Chapter II) . This propensity 
provides the second part of the wealth mechanism, for the desire to exchange, and 
the exchange itsel f, accentuate initial differences in talents and lead to further 
division of labour and so further exchange. Even the self-interested motivation to 
economic action is shot through with sympathy, for economic exchange is civil and 
mutually advantageous, not exploitative and war-like .3 
The classical economists of the dominant British tradition, Malthus and Ricardo for 
example, paint a narrower portrait, but still one in which self-interest is only one 
of several motivations and preferences . For Thomas Malthus (1803), man 's self-
interest is more than often overwhelmed by his natural proclivity to create children. 
The interaction of these motives creates the economic cycle between poverty (and 
worse) and satisfaction in the lives of the working poor. Moral restraint can act as 
a check on population growth, only because man is using his "reasoning faculty" to 
decide to have less children. For David Ricardo (1821), as for Smith, capitalists 
are prepared to accept different rates of profit depending on their perception of the 
2 Whereas Mandeville ' s account thrived on the use of positive analogies between the 
bee society and the human, Smith uses dogs to point out the differences between man 
and the animals. It is these solely human behavioural characteristics which generate 
the complex economy he describes . 
3 Smith here follows the tradition of thinking about trade by Hume and by the 
mercantil ists - see Hirschman (1977) . 
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"security, cleanliness , ease, or any other real or fancied advantage which one 
employment may possess over another" (p 49) . 
The psychology of classical economists ' whole man tells us about his motivations 
and his actions, but not about the individual effect these motivations and actions 
create, for we cannot gauge the outcomes of anyone person's behaviour. 
Individual volition is characterised as part of group behaviour, e.g . the behaviour 
of man as buyer or seller, or as capitalist or labourer. Members of the group 
behave in a like manner, but it is only the effects of their aggregate actions that can 
be traced in outcomes in the economy. The iron law of wages and the Malthusian 
laws of population necessarily apply only in the aggregate . These laws (and the 
abstract or "theoretical" entities they involve, such as "the general rate of profit" or 
"the natural price") emerge as the unintended consequences of individuals ' actions 
at the level of groups or classes . It is at the various aggregate levels in classical 
economics where we fmd the abstract laws of political economy operating, not at 
the level of the motivations or behaviour of individuals . Thus , individual 
motivations and actions are essential for the economic world to go around , and 
determine the sort of world it is (a producing economy), yet individuals are 
powerless in the face of the governing economic laws. 
HOlrw Economicus 
The fust explicit and conscious narrowing in the characterization of economic 
behaviour came with polymath John Stuart Mill's creation of homo economicus, a 
man restricted in his emotional range solely to economic motivations and 
propensities . In his On the Definition of Political Economy (1836), Mill defmes the 
science of economics as follows : 
"It does not treat of the whole of man 's nature as modified by the social 
state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society . It is concerned with him 
solely as a being who desires to possess wealth and who is capable of 
judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end" (p 
321). 
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Mill's characterization of economic man is an "abstraction" from whole man, and 
was consciously introduced to make a science of economics possible in two 
respects . First, in deftning the domain of political economy separate from other 
ftelds , Mill concentrates on only those aspects of man' s behaviour which come 
under the realm of economics (though of course he recognises that man consists of 
a plurality of motives). Amongst those motives that have to do with political 
economy, Mill believed that there is only one constant positive motivation, namely, 
a desire for wealth, accompanied by the only two "perpetual" impediments being 
"aversion to labour, and desire of present enjoyment of costly indulgences" (p 
321). As is entirely appropriate for a "classical " economist, Mill's defmition 
shows the contemporary concern with production (not consumption as in twentieth 
century economics) and with wealth (not utility) . (Note that it is Mill's second 
perpetual impediment that switches to become the centrepiece of positive 
motivation in the next version of economic man!) Mill downgrades the Malthusian 
motivation for population increase to an important but non-perpetual motivation . In 
addition, Mill suggests that the institutions important to economic behaviour also 
fl ow from this primary desire to possess wealth (e.g. laws on property are 
institutions designed by man to further his success in accumulating wealth) . 
Bagehot described this creation of political economy as dealing 
"not with the entire real man as we know him in fact , but with a simpler, 
imaginary man - a man answering to a pure defmition from which all 
impairing and conflicting [i .e. non-economic] elements have been fmed 
away." (Bagehot, 1898, p 97) 
This abstraction is necessary to Mill , for only by delimiting the scope of the subject 
domain of economics can anything speciftc be said of economic behaviour. But, in 
Mill's homo economicus , we already see signs of economists ' willingness to 
caricature their central character, for here we have the portrait of a lazy , miserly , 
but entirely effective, Scrooge. 
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In the second place, Mill found that the practice of a scientific method in 
economics required such a character as homo economicus . In economics, causes 
come compounded. For a scientific treatment, it is essential to separate them out 
and look at them one at a time. This was best done by taking account fust of the 
main economic cause and assuming that no other causes operated in order to 
produce a "nearer approximation .. . to the real order of human affairs in those 
[the economic] departments" . Then, the perpetual economic impediments could be 
added back and fmally corrections made to the original abstraction for the non-
perpetual and minor causes "which interfere with the results in any particular case" 
(both quotes, p 323). With economic man defmed in terms of a hierarchical 
structure consisting of one constant motivation , two constant impediments , and a 
number of non-constant motivations, Mill's main character actor was ready and 
waiting for a causal analysis according to the scientific method appropriate for 
economics (see Whitaker, 1975). This did not occur in classical economics, for, as 
we have seen, the governing laws operate at the aggregate level , the outcome of 
individuals ' collective behaviour in which anyone individual was ineffective. 
Calculating Man 
With the so-called "marginal revolution" in economics in the 1870s, Mill's abstract 
economic man received a new characterization and became individually causally 
effective. Whereas Mill's classical economics had rested upon laws of production 
and distribution and had rejected the existence of any economic laws of 
consumption, for Jevons , 
"Economics must be founded upon a full and accurate investigation of the 
conditions of utility; and, to understand this element, we must necessarily 
examine the wants and desires of man . .. .. it is surely obvious that 
economics does rest upon the laws of human enjoyment" (Jevons, 1871, P 
102) . 
As the textbooks on the history of economics recount: the marginal revolution 
replaced the classical focus on the production of wealth with a focus on the utility 
to be gained from consumption (see for example, Blaug 1985). This shift had 
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considerable implications for economists' theory of value, theory of the market and 
notion of equilibrium. Although these momentous changes in economics were 
begun by several economists with slightly different interpretations, I will focus on 
the contributions of the English scientist William Stanley Jevons (1871) and his 
main character, whom I shall call "calculating man". This is the direct ancestor of 
modem economics' rational economic man . 
Jevons ' calculating man is a pleasure seeker - he "maximizes utility" from 
consumption. An explicit follower of Benthamite thinking, Jevons' utility has two 
dimensions, duration and intensity of pleasure (or negative pleasure, pain) .4 More 
of a good is preferred to less, but satisfaction declines with successive units of the 
good consumed. When faced with two goods: the consumer weighs the intensity 
and duration of pleasure from consumption of the different goods until they are 
equal, where they can be exchanged at the margin (and this in turn gives exchange 
ratios and so relative prices of goods) . By adopting mathematical conceptions and 
methods from mechanics (maximization and the method of differential calculus to 
measure inftnitesimal changes) , Jevons gives an aura of exactitude to the outcomes 
of calculating man's behaviour (see Schabas , 1990) . Indeed, Jevons appears to 
suggest that man makes such calculations for himself: his brain uses such 
mathematics to determine his decisions . 
In marginal economics, and in the neoclassical economic theory which grew out of 
it, the theoretical laws of economics operate at the level of the individual. On the 
one hand, this means the aggregate outcome is the effect of the individual laws , as 
4 Bentham's (1789) scientific claims involved a reductiouist theory of mind that 
sensations (pleasures/pains) lead to mental associations and that pleasure is 
homogenous and quantifiable. Although he used mathematical metaphors: "felicific 
calculus" , "axioms of mental pathology" etc , he did not formulate these ideas 
mathematicall y. 
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Jevons carefully explained when he laid out his mathematical theory of marginal 
utility : 
"The laws which we are about to trace out are to be conceived as 
theoretically true of the individual ; they can only be practically verified as 
regards the aggregate transactions , productions ,and consumptions of a large 
body of people. But the laws of the aggregate depend of course upon the 
laws applying to individual cases ." (Jevons, 1871, P 108-9) 
On the other hand , it is also the case that the aggregate is found not by the addition 
of individuals following similar courses of action (as in classical theories) , but from 
the combination of the actions of individuals following the same individual laws but 
with different preferences. 
Not only do the laws of neoclassical economics operate at the individual level , but 
each and every decision by the individual calculating man can make a difference to 
the aggregate outcome. We see this clearly explained by Francis Edgeworth (1881) 
(who incidentally appears to have been responsible for narning the calculating man 
an economic "agent"). Edgeworth stresses the ability of each individual , with 
different tastes and different initial amounts of goods, to contract freely in the 
market place. This enables him to explore the effect on market outcomes of adding 
each successive individual. Only by starting out with the individuals , can 
Edgeworth give an account of the various aggregate outcomes such as market 
price, quantity, and the related concept of "perfect" competition. 
Defining economic behaviour in terms of individual goal directed maximising of 
utility turns out to mean that if the preferences of just one of all the calculating 
consumers in the economy changes in a specific direction, the demand for the 
product changes, and the prices of all the other products also change because of the 
way these calculating individuals are linked together into the aggregate. In the 
general equilibrium of this aggregate economy, 5 all the consumers are at their 
5 This general equilibrium aggregate was formally characterized by the Frenclunan 
Leon Walras and the Italian Vilfredo Pareto. 
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maximwn utility, subject to their budget constraints , and so the total pleasure has 
been maximized. 
In connecting individual utility maximization with total maximized pleasure , 
calculating man' s actions acquired "morally" good overtones inherited from one of 
his other ancestors: utilitarianism. The utilitarian ideas of Bentham took as a fact 
that men are pleasure seekers , and as a norm that the promotion of general good 
(pleasure= happiness) should be the criterion of moral goodness. Bentham's 
utilitarian philosophy pervaded classical economics through the work of James Mill 
and his son LS. Mill. In the classical economics version, individual self-interest 
and the general interest are explicitly linked by a general "invisible hand" 
argument, and thus utilitarian principles and classical economic principles were 
easily conflated (see Welch, 1987) . 
While utilitarianism was linked to the classical economists' focus on self-interested 
production, it seemed innocuous at least to British economists, fitting as it did onto 
the Protestant work culture and virtues of classical economic man. TItis was not so 
in America, where throughout the 19th century, economists had embraced the 
classical economics of Smith or Mill , yet decried the egoistical element in their 
characterization of economic man. With the marginal revolution, self interest 
became defined in terms of pleasure seeking conswnption and began to look more 
like selfishness , so no longer seemed so morally secure particularly to the 
American economists (see Horowitz, 1985) . Thus, the American marginalist 
economist, J .B . Clark (1899), sought instead for a moral basis in terms of fairness 
or equity in distribution at the centre of his version of the marginal revolution (see 
Everett 1946, Morgan 1994). In contrast, for the Anglo-Irish economist, 
Edgeworth, with his utilitarian approach, morals and sympathy only came into play 
when the theoretical economic laws based on self-interested utility maximising had 
all but detemlined me fmal outcome. 
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Although the marginal revolution appeared to provide a psychological underpinning 
for "economic man" , the extent and depth of this calculating man' s psychology has 
always been open to argument. Jevons explicitly refers to early 19th century 
associationist psychology and physiological literature on satiation; Edgeworth drew 
on psychophysics experiments done by Feclmer (see Chaigneau, 1995) . If this was 
the introduction of psychology, then it was a limited and decidedly physical one: no 
room for free will or for other propensities, instincts, talents or preferences . 
Marginal economists of the calculating variety came under strong criticism, both 
from inside and outside economics, for treating man too much like a Pavlovian 
dog. This was particularly true in the American context, where psychologists and 
pragmatic philosophers attacked the character of economic man as not only 
unrealistic, but also unscientific , according to latest thinking in both psychology 
and philosophy (see Coats , 1976) . Economists too were not all convinced. Some 
took exception to the assumptions of mental power with which calculating man was 
endowed. J .M. Clark complained, with several telling examples from the genre, 
that economic man was "absorbed in his irrationally rational passion for 
impassionate calculation" (1918 , p 24) . For others, a "whole man" was necessary 
for any progress in economic science. In a well-known attack, Thorstein Veblen 
described calculating man as 
"a lightening calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a 
homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the influence of stimuli 
that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. " (Veblen 1919, in 1948, 
p 232) 
Such attacks on the one-dimensional hedonist of marginal/neoclassical economics 
from those desiring a more "realistically", or scientifically, whole economic man, 
forced American economists to make a choice in the early twentieth century, a 
choice between different social science approaches to the study of man 's behaviour 
(made easier by the fact that the social sciences were at that time just splitting into 
la 
separate professional groupS)6. Some (who became known as American 
Institutional economists) chose a mixture of the historical/sociological and 
anthropological approaches to understanding man's economic behaviour as a 
rounded whole. The historical-sociological element defmed the typical economic 
man in such a way as to keep all salient characteristics of the type (the kind of 
"ideal type" used in German historical and sociological economics). 7 The line 
taken from anthropology focused on the habitual ways of behaviour and institutions 
which characterised economic society. In this "institutional" tradition, the 
commitment to detailed knowledge of human complexity makes it difficult to apply 
formal analytical technjques sufficient to provide concrete answers to concrete 
questions. 
Others chose the economics route of a model of man, but, these emergent 
neoclassical American economists defended themselves against further attack by 
pushing psychology even further out of the picture . It was easier, after all, simply 
to assunle that every individual acts as they desire to do, and that everything 
6 There were of course oilier possible strategies for dealing with the complexity of 
human behaviour which had emerged during the development of social science in the 
nineteenth century. They are not discussed here. 
7 I am hesitant to use Max Weber 's name here, because Machlup suggests that Weber 
was quite happy to regard the classical economists ' model man as an ideal type: 
"Such ideal-typical constructions are exemplified by the concepts and "laws" 
formulated in pure economic theory . They state what course human conduct 
of a particular kind would take if it were strictJy rational (in a subjective sense 
built into the type), unaffected by error and emotion and , furthermore , if..l! 
were completely and uniquely oriented toward only one objective, namely , 
economizing" (Weber quoted in MacWup, 1978, p238). 
This suggests that Weber would fmd 20th century rational economic man as good an 
example of the ideal type as he did the nineteenth century homo economicus character 
to which he referred here. Nevertheless , as Machlup's account makes clear, most 
German hjstorical economists would probably not have recognised the classical 
economists ' man as a useful ideal type. 
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behind this is a problem for the realm of psychology (or some other social science) 
as Irving Fisher did in the opening paragraphs of his 1892 thesis. 
The British side of the neoclassical tradition also retreated from psychology, but 
this seems to have been associated with their failure to provide a measurement 
programme or empirical cowlterpart to calculating man's theorized behaviour. 
Marginalists like Jevons and Marshall had assumed that you could calculate the 
satisfaction from your utilities , if not make interpersonal comparisons between 
people' s satisfactions . But by the 1930s economists were uncomfortable with both 
these claims. By then all the analytical work was done with "indifference curves ", 
maps of an individual economic man 's points of indifference between two goods, 
which replaced the utility functions (though these remained for teaching purposes , 
and even appear in theorists ' equations , they do little work) . In indifference curve 
analysis, introduced by Edgeworth and Vilfredo Pareto and developed by Hicks and 
Alien in the 1930s (see e.g . Blaug, 1985), there is almost nothing left from 
psychology, we merely notice that people prefer more to less, and that they can 
compare and value commodities in indifference curves (the utility measure is 
ordinal not cardinal) . But sti.!l, this indifference curve analysis remains in the 
realm of theory , for points of indifference are not empirically observed. 
Slot-Machine Man 
Whereas Jevons had provided a vestige of economic motivation in his idealized 
calculating model of man, it was the main American exponent of neoclassical 
economics, Frank Knight (in his thesis of 1915, published in 1921) who worked 
out the details which allowed calculating man to play his full role in the formal 
neoclassical theory of the economy. QnJy by endowing calculating man with full 
information about everything in the economy (rather than limited information) , and 
with full foresight (rather than uncertainty) about the future, could the individual 
person make the necessary calculations which would allow him to judge accurately 
what actions to take in buying and selling and consuming. And onJy by assuming 
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that there were infmitely many of him, and that each acted independently of the 
others , could neoclassical analysis depict the perfectly competitive economy 
necessary to arrive at an equilibrium outcome which maximised aggregate utility . 
Knight was the first to admit that a world peopled by such individuals was no 
longer a simplification, but an "heroic" abstraction. 
"The above list of assumptions and artificial abstractions is indeed rather a 
formidable array . The intention has been to make the list no longer than 
really necessary or useful , but in no way to minimize its degree of 
artificiality, the amount of divergence of the hypothetical conditions from 
those of actual economic life about us ." (Knight, 1921, P 81). 
While the classical economists had pared down to homo economicus , marginal and 
neoclassical economists such as Knight exaggerated certain of his characteristics 
(his calculating ability and his "perfect knowledge") to create a fictional idealized 
model of economic man. These exaggerations were "necessary" not for 
understanding man in "actual economic life" but in order that economic man could 
play the part required of him in the overall mathematical theory of the economy 
being constructed by the neoclassical economists . 
Knight adopted this route because, like Mill , he argued that scientific economics 
placed severe limitations on the treatment of man. In order to arrive at defmite 
analytical results about the workings of markets , the outcomes of perfect 
competition, and the economy as a whole, the scientific domain and method of 
economics is necessarily restricted to dealing with an idealized economic man not 
with actual people. Knight later portrayed this idealized economic man as a slot 
machine: "The Economic Man neither competes nor higgles ... he treats other 
human beings as if they were slot machines" (Knight, 1947, p 80), not even a one-
dimensional man , but a purely impersonal agent (as economists now say) with no 
vices, virtues , desires, children. This ideal figure of economic science does not 
help to describe actual economic behaviour, and so carmot be used for socially 
useful economic analysis or policy interventions . Because Knight was committed 
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to certain liberal democratic beliefs , he also wrote moral commentaries describing 
man' s actual economic behaviour (for example, he is perhaps the flfst economist to 
describe competition as an in-built human urge) in which he explicitly denied that 
the rational economic man of his analytical work had any realistic importance (see 
Knight, 1923, Emmett, 1994) . Although these two domains of his economics were 
largely separate , by providing both moral and formal mathematical economics, 
Knight was following in the same path as the American marginalist J .B. Clark. 
Rational Economic Man 
Though the neoclassical idealized economic man used by Knight was well-clothed 
with artificial assumptions about his knowledge and foresight, yet his underlying 
human character had become decidedly thin . His character all but disappears in the 
mid-twentieth century, when he gains the label "rational" . This may seem counter-
intuitive, so let me explain. Economists have used two notions of the word 
rational : one relates to reasoning behaviour, the other to choosing behaviour. In 
the early neoclassical economics of Knight, "rational" meant reasoned , goal-
directed, activity, a notion which hardly differs from the reasoned pursuit of self-
interest which we frod in the classical economics of Adam Smith. It is rational in 
the second "choosing" sense which is so closely linked to mid-twentieth century 
neoclassical economics. In this twentieth century characterization, the "rationality" 
of economic man has become a more important question than his motivations and 
desires . 
A little more history will help here. The marginal revolution had put economic 
choice (particularly between goods) at the centre of economic behaviour. But 
while Jevons' analysis was concerned with how such decisions were made, the 
nature of the choices received little attention from him. More is better than less , 
but beyond that, Jevons ' account was limited: he gave no way of choosing between 
equal utility-valued goods . Although Jevons' mathematical formulation of 
economic man is widely believed to be the basis for neoclassical economics in the 
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twentieth century, not all marginalist economists followed his utilitarian, 
mathematical version of the new economic man. Indeed, the Austrian marginalist, 
Carl Menger (1871), discussed individual and subjective valuation without any of 
the apparatus of utilitarian calculus, or of calculating mathematical man, or of the 
single-minded hedonism which seemed to characterize levons' account. In 
Menger ' s account, man is an economizer: he satisfies different needs with 
different goods by choosing them in such a way as to satisfy his needs in a 
particular order (with necessities first , luxuries second etc) . His subjective 
valuation (based on introspection) is concerned with choice between satisfying 
different needs, rather than with calculating the standard units of pleasure from 
consuming different goods as levons ' calculating man does. It is only in this 
Austrian marginalist tradition that we fmd an economic account of choosing. 
Nevertheless, there is a crucial switch of focus from the marginalists ' account of 
choosing to mid-twentieth century ec.onomists ' rational economic man. In the 
marginalists ' conception (whether of levons or Menger) , man's 
desires/motivations/needs are primary and they dictate choices . For 20th century 
rational economic man, it is choices which are dominant, and it is assumed that 
desires can only be maximised or satisfied by "rational" choices . This commitment 
to rational economic man is clearly expressed by Lionel Robbins (an English 
economist, but with some roots in the Austrian tradition of Menger): 
"The fundamental concept of economic analysis is the idea of relative 
valuations ; and , as we have seen, while we assume that different goods have 
different values at different margins , we do not regard it as part of our 
problem to explain why these particular valuations exist. We take them as 
data . So far as we are concerned, our economic subjects can be pure 
egoists, pure altruists , pure ascetics, pure sensualists or - what is much more 
likely - mixed bundles of all these impulses." (1932, p 95) 
1.M. Clark (an American anti-neoclassical economist with a perceptive line in 
satire) characterised the situation thus : 
"Our old friend, the "economic man," is becoming very self-conscious and 
bafflingly non-committal. Instead of introducing himself to his readers with 
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his old time freedom, he says: "I may behave one way and I may behave 
another, but what is that to you? You must take my choices as you find 
them: I choose as I choose and that is all you really need to know." The 
poor thing has been told that his psychology is all wrong, and he is gamely 
trying to get on without any and still perform as many as possible of his 
accustomed tasks . He has become a symbol, rather than a means of 
description or explanation." (1936, p 9) 
By making choices dominant over desires, twentieth century economics effectively 
allowed economic man to have any type of motivations, provided he chose 
"rationally" . 
This switch follows from pushing out psychology and from indifference curve 
analysis , but the key analytical move is Paul Samuel son' s revealed preference 
formulation of utility . Samuelson's thesis (1938, published in 1947), written under 
the influence of operational ism, had got rid even of the indifference maps from 
theory, in favour of the only thing he thought could be measured and known, 
namely, man's "revealed preferences"8. Samuelson was explicit: 
"The utility analysis rests on the fundamental assumption that the individual 
confronted with given prices and confined to a given total expenditure selects 
that combination of goods which is highest on his preference scale . This 
does not require (a) that the individual behave rationally in any other sense; 
(b) that he be deliberate and self-conscious in his purchasing; (c) that there 
exist any intensive magnitude which he feels or consults." (1947, p 97-8) 
The critical question is : What does "behaving rationally" "in selecting that 
combination of goods which is highest on his preference scale" mean? Behaving 
rationally in this analysis means choosing more over less of a good, and that 
choices over a number of goods must be "consistent" and "transitive" . These are 
the characteristics which defIne a "rational" choice. 
8 At the same time von Neumann and Morgenstem (1944 /47) developed a 
measurement formulation for expected utility based on preference comparisons and 
assuming that risk was involved. Again man 's preferences are revealed through his 
valuations . 
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From Samuel son on, in the by now dominant American neoclassical economics, 
economists preferred to assume nothing about peoples' motivations, but to suppose 
that, however arrived at, their choices are rational . "Rational economic man" is 
named so because he "chooses rationally". Here rationality is instrumental - we 
know nothing, and economists claim nothing , about the people or their underlying 
feelings, preferences and valuations as in marginal economics, let alone about their 
reasoned aims and motivations as in classical economics; and , as Robbins implies , 
economists don' t even care. Neoclassical economists are interested only in 
consequences or outcomes, not causes. As Fritz Machlup has observed "the ideal 
type of horrw economicus is designed for interpreting observed consequences of 
men's actions", not for interpreting the actions themselves (Machlup, 1978, p 281) . 
Rational economic man has ceased to have any explanatory power over the causes 
of economic behaviour. 
The reputation of rational economic man was at its height in the 1970s. Hahn and 
Hollis epitomise the position: 
"The pure economist's defmition of rational choice is now this: Given the 
set of available actions, the agent chooses rationally if there is no other 
action available to him the consequence of which he prefers to that of the 
chosen action." (1979, p 4) 
before they go onto show the implications of this in a number of well-defmed 
theoretical situations. The results are analytically striking, though one might well 
argue that their defmition of rational choice doesn't rule much out. Their point is 
clear however, neoclassical economics has built a body of theoretical results on the 
back of rational economic man. Significantly also, though economists ' central 
character no longer supports claims to explain the causes of economic behaviour, 
neoclassical economists claim it provides a guide to action. This follows from the 
fac t that rational economic man is interested in consequences . Hahn and Hollis 
again: 
"The rational man of pure theory is an ideal type in the sense not only of 
being an idealization where the theory holds without qualification but also of 
17 
being a model to copy, a guide to action. In pointing out the way to satisfy 
a given set of ordered preferences, the theorist gives reasons for action." (p 
14) 
The "reasons for action" are not in the initial feelings of the subjects, but are 
rationalised (or reasoned backwards) by the economist from looking at the 
consequences. 
In more recent years, it has turned out that rational economic man is not quite such 
a strong character as economists of the 1970s thought. To start with the analysis 
of consequences : it seems, following the results of laboratory experiments in 
economics and of game theory , that economists have found good reasons to think 
about the sense in which economic man's rationality might be "bounded" or his 
consistency relaxed. These widespread recent developments still take rational 
economic man as the ideal, and then analyze what might happen to outcomes (or 
what re-interpretation of experimental results occur) if he were not so perfectly 
"rational" as he is painted. Secondly, it seems that for the older economic issues 
of competition, markets and general equilibrium economics, rationality on its own 
does not get you very far. As Knight pointed out in his thesis way back in 1921 , 
and as Arrow has argued more recently (1986) , the individual rationality of 
economic man has to be combined with other basic tenets of modem economics 
(e.g. other assumptions for perfect competition or general equilibrium) to get 
strong formal results , this despite the fact that the justification for the 
characterization was its ability to provide formal analytical results . In the third 
place, attempts to use the individual rational man as a "representative agent" to 
underpin macroeconomic theory has been found to be ill-conceived (Kirman 1992). 
Finally, attempts have been made to alter the basic characterization of economic 
man's rationality (for two good examples, see Sen, 1976-7 and Simon, 1976). 
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Rational Economic Man: A Caricature 
This short history has been following the route by which economists adopted a 
model of man' s economic behaviour. We have traversed through a series of 
increasingly narrowing portraits . From Adam Smith's whole man, through Mill's 
homo economicus, to Jevons ' calculating man and Edgeworth's agent, economic 
man gradually became thinner during the nineteenth century. Each move was 
made as part of a simplifying strategy, to reduce the complexity of dealing with all 
human feelings and emotions and actions that flow from them and , at the same time 
to focus the attention on the explicitly economic aspects of man's behaviour. This 
was the nineteenth century economists' answer to dealing with the complexity of 
human behaviour in a scientific way. Tt provided us with a model economic man. 
He was taken to represent real man , but had been pared down to focus on the 
picture of economic behaviour in its simplest, purest form, unaffected by other 
considerations . 
From late-nineteenth century marginal economics onwards, we found these pure 
forms of economic behaviour exaggerated to an extreme degree as economic man 
became endowed with extraordinary amounts of economic knowledge and certainty 
in a bid to analyze the fullest effect of economizing behaviour. In neoclassical 
economics of the twentieth century, economic man is no longer taken to represent 
real man, but to be an artificial character created by the economists. The process 
of simplifying and focusing attention on the quintessential economic behaviour 
offered the possibilities of analytical results within this narrowed framework, and 
so seemed to economists a sensible scientific strategy compared to the alternative 
social science approaches of studying real economic behaviour of man with all his 
feelings and amongst his family and community. The nineteenth century invention, 
homo economicus, and his twentieth century descendent, rational economic man , 
are equally part of this simplifying and exaggerating strategy. 
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This strategy can be recognised not just as one of model building, but as one of 
creating a caricature. A caricature relies on the artist taking a subjective view: it 
not only simplifies, but relies on a distortion or exaggeration of certain 
characteristics beyond the point of objective truth . It is this exa~geration that 
enables us to recognise the true importance of the characteristic exaggerated . The 
same is true of "rational economic man". He is not only a simplification of man, 
as all models will be, but he is also a caricature for he epitomises to an extreme 
degree the essential characteristics of economic behaviour. The caricature emerged 
gradually, for over the generations , economists became less concerned with 
representing elements of real life man, and more concerned with idealizing him for 
his role in the theoretical economy. Once economists no longer strove for an 
accurate representation of economic man, they were free to take a more subjective 
view in their portrayal of their central character. 9 It is this caricature model of 
man lO which economists have found helps them to learn about the idealized 
(theoretical) economy, and it does so because it enables them to explore the 
economic behaviour of man and its consequences in its most exaggerated form . 
The caricature of economic behaviour involved in rational economic man makes 
economics laughable to other social scientists, but it is also the reason economists 
cite for their analytical success compared to the other social sciences, (where man, 
if he is modelled at all, is an altogether more rounded and serious character).11 
9 While recent science studies have focused on the ways in which economic scientists 
adopted methods which were more "objective", particularly through the second half 
of the nineteenth century (see Porter 1995, Furner, 1975), this account implies the 
opposite. 
10 It is significant that one of the few accounts of modelling to have emerged from 
philosophical studies of economics is the portrayal of models as caricatures (see 
Gibbard and Varian, 1978) . 
11 For example, see Leonard ' s (1994) paper on experimental game theory compares 
economists limited characterization of behaviour with that of psychologists undertaking 
the same experiment. 
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Economic man modelled in such a way becomes analytically tractable, whereas 
paradoxically, if he were a more reasonable person, he would be less tractable . 
Though economists have come to depend upon their caricature, we should not 
necessarily treat rational economic man with derision , for noone would deny the 
value of caricatures in giving us truthful insight. 
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